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Abstract 
Since the beginning of the country’s transition to a market economy, herders in Mongolia have 
encountered enormous challenges. Degradation of pastureland resulting from overgrazing seri-
ously jeopardizes the vulnerable livelihoods of herder household economies. An analysis of the 
grazing strategies used by herders in the Ugtaal district in the Tov province (North of the capital) 
and the Gurvansaikhan district in the Dundgovi province (south of the capital) is the focus of this 
study.  
Analysis of collected primary data (using a Principle Component Analysis) revealed that herders 
in Ugtaal rank security before environmental quality in their grazing strategies, while herders in 
Gurvansaikhan rank environmental quality first. A regression analysis indicated that richer herd-
ers care more for the environment than poorer herders in Ugtaal. The game estimation shows that 
herders in Ugtaal face a reverse assurance game in choosing the growth in herd size. Hence, herd 
maximising behaviour leads to the highest payoff, while a second equilibrium exists where herd-
ers keep their herds constant. The herders in Gurvansaikhan also face a reverse assurance game 
in choosing the growth in herd size. The conclusion of this game is the same as for the game in 
Ugtaal. Institutional changes could alter herders’ behaviour, but this would come at the cost of 
lowering their income by about 30% in Gurvansaikhan, and by as much as 60% in Ugtaal. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the beginning of the country’s transition to a market economy, herders in Mongo-
lia have encountered enormous challenges. Degradation of pastureland resulting from 
overgrazing seriously jeopardizes the vulnerable livelihoods of herder household econo-
mies.  
After the collapse of communist rule in Mongolia in 1991, the demise of the livestock 
collectives resulted in individual (household-based) livestock ownership, and an unclear 
range of management institutions. Between 1991 and 1998, the livestock enterprise rap-
idly expanded. This was partly due to relatively good weather conditions, and partly a 
result of the de-industrialisation of the urban economy, which led to many people enter-
ing the livestock economy. In 1990, Mongolia had 25.9 million domesticated animals. In 
1998, this had grown to 32.9 million, an increase of 27%. The increase was not a result 
of a growing number of sheep; indeed, the number of sheep even decreased slightly, 
from 15.1 million to 14.7 million. In addition, the number of camels decreased from 0.5 
million to 0.4 million. The growth was instead due to increasing numbers of horses 
(from 2.3 million to 3.0 million), cattle and yaks (from 2.8 million to 3.7 million), and 
goats (from 5.1 million to 11.1 million). The rapid growth of the number of goats was a 
result of a strong demand for goats’ hair, also known as cashmere (NSOM 2001).   
Between 1990 and 1998, the weather conditions were favourable. Compared to the 
1980s, rainfall was higher and the winters less severe (Batjargal et al, 2000). The carry-
ing capacity of the Mongolian grazing lands improved, and generally accommodated the 
growing livestock population. However, i) changes in livestock mobility, ii) a new range 
of management styles and iii) unclear grazing institutions under privatised livestock 
management regimes, started to create carrying capacity tensions in some areas. Where 
water wells were no longer maintained, some grazing areas were abandoned, resulting in 
concentrated grazing in other areas2.  
Between 1999 and 2002, winter conditions deteriorated and spring/summer rainfall also 
declined. The dzuds, as these severe winters are known in Mongolia, were disastrous for 
both Mongolian livestock and for the expanded herder community. It was estimated that 
12 million animals died nation-wide, and out of an estimated 190,000 herding house-
holds (in 1998), 11,000 families lost all their animals (Danker, 2004, p. 26). In Decem-
ber 2002, the total number of animals had gone down to only 24 million, back to the 
level of the late 1980s. Compared to 1998, losses were most severe among horses (-64%) 
and cattle (-49%), and least severe among goats (only -18%). These figures are presented 
in Table 1. 
                                                   
2 According to CPR (2003), out of 41,600 wells operational in 1990, only 30,900 were still op-
erational in 2000. 
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Table 1 Livestock numbers in Mongolia, 1990, 1998 and 2002. 
 1990 1998 2002 % change over 1990-1998% change over 1998-2002
Horses 2.3 3.0 1.1 33% -64% 
Cattle/Yak 2.9 3.7 1.9 30% -49% 
Camels 0.5 0.4 0.3 -26% -35% 
Sheep 15.1 14.7 10.6 -3% -28% 
Goats 5.1 11.1 9.1 117% -18% 
Total 55.3 69.9 39.0 26% -44% 
      
Note: Total is expressed in sheep units (SU): 1 sheep = 1 SU, 1 horse = 7 SU, 1 cattle/yak = 6 
SU, 1 camel = 5 SU, 1 goats = 0.9 SU. 
The Mongolian Government has shifted in its policy direction towards more productiv-
ity-oriented herding strategies. However, it is likely to take substantial time and effort 
before Mongolian herders adopt these new approaches. Traditionally, herders believe 
that good years follow bad years, and former losses will usually be recovered. This men-
tality persists today and appears to be a major psychological barrier preventing herders 
from preparing better for the (often-severe) winter season. It also motivates herd maxi-
mising behaviour.  
Through game analysis, this paper aims to highlight the unsustainable nature of herder 
behaviour. The type of game herders face when competing for grazing pastures will be 
determined by looking at actual herders' behaviour. A further objective of this paper is to 
identify the main dimensions of herder behavior, by undertaking a Principal Component 
Analysis.  
The hypotheses that guide the study are: 
• The poorer the herders, the worse the quality of their pastureland; 
• The poorer the herders, the greater the willingness to maximise animal numbers.; 
• Maximising animal numbers is optimal behaviour for herders; 
• There are viable ways to change herders' behaviour towards socially optimal animal 
numbers; 
• Herder behaviour which maximises animal numbers causes a long-term degradation 
of ranges, which increases poverty. 
To test these hypotheses, we gathered (empirical) information on three key sets of vari-
ables, namely (1) herder income as a proxy for poverty, (2) change in animal numbers as 
a proxy for herder behaviour, and (3) herder perception of the environment as a proxy 
for environmental degradation. 
The outline of this paper is as follows: Section 2 starts with a presentation of the grazing 
situation in Mongolia. It highlights specific details of the two selected case study re-
gions, Ugtaal and Gurvansaikhan, and discusses the data collected from herders in these 
regions. The collected data is analysed in Section 3, by undertaking a Principle Compo-
nent Analysis on the perception herders have of their environment. Additionally, a mul-
tiple regression analysis was undertaken to verify, for instance, whether there is a link 
between poverty and herd size and/or perception of the environment. Section 4 gives the 
(technical) description of the game estimation in which herders compete for the use of 
pastureland, and outlines the results of the analysis 4. In Section 5 the study’s conclu-
sions are drawn.  
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2. Description of the field setting 
2.1 A specific look at two research areas: Ugtaal and Gurvansaikhan 
Two areas were studied. The first area, Ugtaal sum (district) in the Tov aimag (prov-
ince), is in the north, in part of what is called the ‘forest steppe’. This area has more rain-
fall and more severe winter conditions. The second area, Gurvansaikhan sum in 
Dundgovi aimag, is in the South, close to the Gobi desert. This area has less rainfall and 
less severe winter conditions.  
These two districts have been selected using the following criteria: 
• They have different levels of pasture degradation; 
• They are in different ecological regions, with varying ecological conditions and land 
use patterns; 
• They vary in terms of how they were impacted by the 1999-2001 dzuds. 
Ugtaal sum, Tov aimag 
The Ugtaal sum is located in Mongolia’s steppe region and was created in 1924. The sum 
centre is closer to the capital (at 155 km distance) than to its own aimag centre (at 177 
km distance). It covers a land area of 154.8 thousand ha, of which 110.7 thousand ha is 
pasture, 15.1 thousand ha is arable land and 1.2 thousand ha consists of haymaking ar-
eas. It also has 8.3 thousand ha of forest. According to the latest sum (district) statistics, 
23.0 thousand ha of pastures have been degraded. 
The sum’s population was at 2816 as of January 2004, with total of 715 families. 74.8 
per cent of families (households with animals) own less than 200 animals. There are 270 
families with up to 50 animals per family, including non-herder families (Table 2). From 
2002 to 2003, the population and the number of livestock decreased by 9.3 percent and 
7.0 percent respectively. The number of households with more than 200 animals de-
creased by 24 percent, while the number of households with up to 200 animals decreased 
by 7.7 percent.  
The decreasing number of households is primarily explained by outward migration from 
Ugtaal to other sums. Local people explained that Ugtaal sum is not a final destination 
for migrating households from the western provinces. Those migrating from the western 
provinces may stay in Ugtaal for a few years and then migrate to the other places. For 
this reason, 60 households and 340 people migrated on to the other places in 2003.  
According to annual livestock census statistics, the living standards of herding house-
holds in Ugtaal sum are decreasing (Table 2). 
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Table 2 The household’s grouping by number of animals, Ugtaal sum. 
Years Indicators  
1997 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Population 4170 3389 2974 3103 2816 
Number of households n.a. 843 706 775 715 
Of which households with animal 
herds including herders households 
794 656 557 562 508 
Of which by percentage:      
Up to 10 heads 13.9% 10.1% 11.8% 14.1% 15.6% 
11-30 heads 26.2% 16.5% 16.7% 15.8% 22.6% 
31-50 heads 15.5% 14.8% 17.4% 17.3% 15.0% 
51-100 heads 23.0% 25.6% 23.3% 24.0% 23.0% 
101-200 heads 15.2% 16.9% 18.1% 17.3% 14.2% 
201-500 heads 5.5% 14.5% 11.3% 10.7% 8.9% 
501-999 heads 0.4% 1.5% 1.1% 0.7% 0.6% 
1000-1499 heads 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 
Above 1500 heads 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Source: Sum’s livestock census data, 2003. n.a. means not available. 
The main economic activity is livestock herding and crop farming. The sum animals 
were severely affected by the dzud impacts in 2001-2002. In 2000 the number of live-
stock reached its maximum level of 152 thousand sheep units. At the end of 2003, there 
were only 86 thousand sheep units left in the sum (a decrease of 43%). The available 
data on livestock are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 Livestock number in Ugtaal sum. 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Camel 2 9 2 4 6 
Horse 8402 7858 6949 6296 5490 
Cattle 7088 6758 3836 3238 2630 
Sheep 38011 41358 28810 24901 19737 
Goat 12712 16319 14105 14987 13357 
Total 150804 151644 113174 101909 85998 
Source:  Sum’s livestock census data, 1999-2003  
Note:  Total is expressed in sheep units (SU): 1 sheep = 1 SU, 1 horse = 7 SU, 1 cattle/yak = 6 
SU, 1 camel = 5 SU, 1 goats = 0.9 SU. 
The Ugtaal sum has 4 areas of otor pastures, which covers 90.0 thousand hectares. These 
otor pastures are reserved for severe weather conditions.  
The current situation of pasture use 
Geographically, the territory of Ugtaal sum belongs to the forest steppe region south of 
the Khentii Mountains in the Mongolian steppe zone, and is part of the Euro-Asian 
steppe region. Mountain steppes prevail in this area (Unatov, 1950). 
Hummock grass and forbs are scattered across the mountain meadow steppe (21.7 thou-
sand ha or 20.3%), and root-stem grass and hummock grass dominate the arid mountain 
steppe (26.7 thousand ha or 27.7%). Root-stem grass, hummock grass, couch, feather 
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grass, bunchgrass and forbs dominate the steppe (41.8 thousand ha or 39.0%) and bunch 
grass, forbs are found in the river steppe meadow (3.1 thousand ha or 2.9%). 
Of the total pastureland, 66.1 thousand ha (62.0%) is pure pastureland, 23.0 thousand ha 
(32.6%) is rocky, 7.9 thousand ha (3.6%) is shrubby, 2.0 thousand ha (1.2%) is hilly, 
while 2.9 thousand ha (0.6%) is unsuitable for pasture. 
Repeated overgrazing for long periods all year round adversely affects pasture vegetation 
growth and regeneration, and leads to declining carrying capacity of pastureland. The 
Eastern region of Ugtaal sum is used for winter grazing, but is now used continuously 
without any movement from one area to another. 
Unsystematic grazing leads to a change in vegetation composition, and useful plant spe-
cies for feeding are replaced with less useful ones, such as chenopadium, artemisia and 
sedge. For example, pastures in the areas of Sevduul and Sovduul are particularly over-
grazed. 
Roads affect 1.2 thousand ha of pastureland in the sum territory, and are another cause of 
pasture degradation. 
Gurvansaikhan sum and Dundgovi aimag 
This sum is located in the Gobi region. The district centre lies 331 km south of the 
Ulaanbaatar and the distance to the aimag centre is 71 km. Its 542 thousand ha consist 
almost entirely (99%) of pastureland. 
The Gurvansaikhan sum’s population was 2690 as of January 2003. Gurvansaikhan is 
one of the most sparsely populated sums in Mongolia; the population density is ap-
proximately 0.5 people per km2 and the density of families with livestock is 12 families 
per 100 km2 in 2003. According to the sum statistics, 36.2 per cent of families own less 
than 200 animals. About 64 % of households with herding livestock have less than 200 
animals in their herd, and 16 % have less than 50 animals. These numbers (see Table 4) 
differ considerably from the numbers for Ugtaal (see Table 2).  
Table 4 Household grouping by number of animal, Gurvansaikhan sum. 
Statement 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Population 2422 2462 2615 2690 
Total number of households 615 592 629 672 
Households with animal herds including herders’ 
households 
517 482 514 649 
Of which by percentage:     
up to 10 heads 3.1% 2.5% 0.6% 1.5% 
11-30 heads 11.4% 4.8% 5.8% 8.3% 
31-50 heads 11.2% 7.1% 7.8% 6.2% 
51-100 heads 28.0% 21.1% 18.1% 20.0% 
101-200 heads 26.0% 29.1% 24.5% 27.7% 
201-500 heads 16.1% 27.2% 34.2% 27.0% 
501-999 heads 3.7% 7.3% 8.2% 8.0% 
1000-1499 heads 0.5% 0.8% 0.6% 1.2% 
Above 1500 heads 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 
 Source: Sum’s livestock census 2000-2003 
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As with most other sums in Mongolia, the primary economic activity is livestock herd-
ing. At the end of 2003, the sum had 203 thousand livestock (in sheep units). The overall 
number of livestock in Gurvansaikhan has been increasing since 2000 (Table ).  
Table 5 Livestock numbers in the Gurvansaikhan sum. 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Camel 1794 1465 1369 1324 1303 
Horse 13475 6701 7099 7628 8321 
Cattle 10157 1867 1673 2174 2862 
Sheep 73275 48161 54100 58277 65731 
Goat 57674 31222 41963 49724 61549 
Total 289419 141695 158443 176089 203059 
 Source: Sum’s livestock census 2000-2003 
Note:  Total is expressed in sheep units (SU): 1 sheep = 1 SU, 1 horse = 7 SU, 1 cattle/yak = 6 
SU, 1 camel = 5 SU, 1 goats = 0.9 SU. 
Current pasture utilization 
The territory of Gurvansaikhan is characteristic of its geographic location, which lies 
across both the central Khalkh’s steppe and the desert steppe region district, Dornogovi. 
Vegetation cover is characterized by feather grass. The sum’s pasture yield per hectare is 
210 kg in summer-autumn time, and 170 kg in the winter-spring period. Fodder re-
sources are 114 Ktonnes in the summer-autumn, and 63.5 Ktonnes in the winter-spring 
period. Annual average fodder resources reach 91.0 Ktonnes. Herders permenantly stay 
around winter-spring camps. This leads to pasture degradation, particularly as there is a 
lack of pasture preservation and effective regulation measures.    
The traditional ‘best practice’ pasture use (such as 4 seasonal rotations) has been aban-
doned. Herders move only twice a year, and the distance between seasonal camps has 
decreased. The animal pressure around the sum centre, water sources, animal shelters 
and campsites tends to exceed the carrying capacity of the pastures.  
Because of a lack of regulation, the use of pastures has become unorganised and unsys-
tematic, which has led to overgrazing and degradation. 
According to a pasture survey conducted in 1992, good pastureland accounted for 37.2% 
(or 197 thousand ha) of the total territory, and 16 thousand ha of pasture was recorded as 
being overgrazed. Another survey in 2002 demonstrated that overgrazed pastures had in-
creased by 28.2%. Overgrazed pastures are especially found to the west of the sum cen-
tre and in the northern area of the sum.  
2.2 Data collected via a primary field survey  
The questionnaire survey was tested in Ugtaal and Gurvansaikhan in September and 
November 2003. The final survey was carried out in Ugtaal from 24 December to 8 
January 2004, and in Gurvansaikhan between 14 and 26 January 2004. 
The purpose of the survey was to select 30 families with a herd of fewer than 200 live-
stock, and 30 families with more than 300 livestock, from each survey site. In addition, 
local government officials and other local stakeholders were interviewed. Furthermore, 
secondary data was gathered from the sum level livestock census, the so-called “A ac-
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count”. The data include very detailed information, going back 7 years in Ugtaal (1997-
2003) and 5 years in Gurvansaikhan (1999-2003). 
The following general principles were used when undertaking the semi-structured inter-
views: 
• The team members encouraged interviewees to express herders’ opinions freely and 
made notes during the discussion. When required, interviewees were asked not to di-
vert too far from the issue under consideration. In many cases, the discussion went 
beyond the questionnaire in order to allow an interviewee to express important 
points; 
• Custom dictates that women and young people should not dominate discussions in 
the presence of elderly people, and this may have to some degree influenced their 
participation in discussions. However, they were encouraged to actively participate; 
• In addition to the selection of herders with less than 200 and more than 300 live-
stock, the broadest variation in terms of livestock numbers within the selected groups 
was sought. 
In total, 85.3% of questions were answered and non-responses accounted for 14.7%. 
Most herders were willing to express their perceptions of the environment but they were 
more reserved when answering questions related to income and expenditures.  
The survey in Ugtaal of Tov aimag 
In Ugtaal, the first meeting was held in the sum centre with the vice governor of the sum, 
Mr. Tsagaankhuu, and followed by meetings with 3 bag governers. During the 
fieldwork, the whole territory of the Ugtaal sum was covered by deep snow. Average 
snow depth was 30 centimeters, and the team discussed ways to reach herders with the 
bag governers. Three bag governers very much helped to implement the survey 
sucessfully. They first called the nearest herders into one of the herding households to 
allow the team to interview the herders. In total, the team visited 11 herding households 
to interview 60 herding household representatives. In total, 27, 24 and 9 households were 
interviewed in the Asgat, Taliin Uul and Khar Chuluut bags respectively.  
Compared to Gurvansaikhan, Ugtaal is much better located in relation to major markets. 
Its primary advantage is its closeness to the capital city of Ulaanbaatar. Another advan-
tage is that herders in Ugtaal have greater opportunities to prepare hay. The average 
amount of hay prepared by one household is 7 tonnes. At the time of survey, most herd-
ers had sent large flocks of animals to the otor pastures where snow depth was lower.   
The survey in Gurvansaikhan of Dundgovi aimag 
When organizing the final interview, the weather conditions in Gurvansaikhan were very 
favorable. This helped the team to select herding households more freely and conduct the 
survey without any difficulties. To select housholds for the survey in Gurvansaikhan, the 
survey team used the same principles as in Ugtaal. Prior selection was made based on the 
number of animals. As indicated by the survey methedology, herding households were 
selected from 2 different groups of 30 households each, one with less than 200 animals 
and the other with more than 300 animals. The survey team also discussed this 
household selection with the sum officials.  
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One of the bag governers, Mr. Tavaandelger, guided the survey team during the survey 
and provided a lot of useful information. With his support, the survey team visited all 60 
herding households for interviews. The survey included representatives from all 5 bags 
in Gurvansaikhan sum. The names of the Bags are Suugaant bag, Dersen-Us bag, Elgen 
bag, Gurvansaikhan bag and Chuluut bag. 
On average, the sum herders migrate 5–8 times per year over distances of 4–11 km. 
More than 80 percent of the herders have access to water within 5 km of their camps. 
Because the pastures are in a relatively good condition, herders do not prepare much 
fodder. Nonetheless, a household prepares about 4–8 packs of hay, 20–50 kg of hand 
fodder and buys 1–2 sacks of bran annually. 
Because of the subsistence nature of herder households, the domestic market for live-
stock products is very small in this sum. Major livestock products such as cashmere, 
meat and live animals are sold to traders from the aimag centre and Ulaanbaatar city. 
Herders confirmed that prices offered by local traders are usually lower than those of-
fered by outside traders. 
Poor herders in this sum face a difficult situation. Their demands for food and clothing 
are mostly met by helpful and wealthier relatives and friends in low-paid and labour-
intensive activities. They may also rely on occasional welfare assistance from different 
sources. However, assistance from wealthy relatives and friends is not always reliable. 
Families who once helped their poor relatives tend to avoid doing so again if they can. 
Looking after animals owned by absentee herders appears to be an important livelihood 
option for poor herders. 
The PRA and secondary data from the livestock census were gathered to gain informa-
tion about two variables: herders’ behaviour and herders’ income   
Key variables used to measure herder behaviour are: 
• Livestock (sheep, goats, cattle, horses, camels) numbers over time; 
• Specification of the numbers of male animals; 
• Specification of the off-take and offspring of animals. 
Herder income (or the net income from the herd) is calculated from fodder purchases, 
veterinary services, sales of animals and animal products. Unfortunately, own consump-
tion of animal products by the household could not be included in the net income be-
cause the response to these questions in the survey was incomplete. 
Within both the Ugtaal and Gurvansaikhan districts, 60 families were interviewed. In to-
tal, this amounted to120 interviews which then could be used in the analysis. The inter-
views were matched with the yearly livestock census to gain a better insight into the 
livestock dynamics over time. 
Then, in order to estimate the game theoretic model as developed in Section 4, we de-
rived the following variables from the herder-data at the household level: 
1. The herd growth rate. This is the difference between offspring and off-take divided 
by the total herd size, and is used to measure the herder’s strategy. This data is 
widely and reliably available from the regular livestock census in Mongolia. We 
need to keep in mind that the total herd size can also be influenced by hazards like 
droughts, dzud and diseases. These factors can be avoided by focusing on a cross 
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section of herders within a single year. Here we focus on an analysis of the year 
2003, for which sufficient data is available; 
2. With regard to the strategy of the herder, we also need a proxy for the net benefit of 
following that strategy. The net benefit consists of the income from sales of produc-
tion minus the cost of production; 
3. To estimate a game, it is useful to obtain a proxy of the herder’s ideas about the 
combined strategy of all other competing herders (i.e. how does a herder think other 
herders will behave?). A good proxy for this is the perceptions of the environmental 
quality of the grazing pastures. By undertaking a Principle Component Analysis on a 
number of collected perceptive indicators, we derived this proxy. The following 
questions were used:  
• What is the current condition of the pastures?  
• Have pasture conditions changed in the last ten years?  
• Do you have access to otor pasture? 
• Are you in favour of grazing reserves? 
• Are the grazing reserves currently functioning well? 
• Does your household have sufficient pasture to increase the herd size? 
3. Data analysis 
3.1 Principle Component Analysis (PCA) 
In order to gain insight into the perceptions of herders with respect to i) their environ-
ment and ii) the behaviour of other herders, we carried out a Principle Component 
Analysis (PCA) on those survey variables that could reflect this perception. The PCA is 
used to reduce a number of variables to a few factors that best explain the variation in the 
variables. These factors can be seen as the main underlying perceptions of the respon-
dents leading to the answers to the selected survey questions.  
The selected variables are: 
PCCUR: describes a herder's perception of the pasture conditions. If pasture conditions 
are considered poor, this could indicate that the other herders have an aggressive strat-
egy, i.e. they are maximising their herd sizes. It may also be a reflection of herders' be-
haviour during the last few years. It is likely that the strategy of the previous years will 
be pursued in the future. 
PCCHANGE: describes a herder's perception of the change in pasture conditions during 
the last ten years. A higher score on this variable indicates improved conditions. As with 
PCCUR, this variable can reflect a herder's perception of other herders’ behaviour: a de-
terioration of the pasture conditions can indicate a maximising strategy. 
ACCOTORP: describes the access to otor pasture. The rationale used for the previous 
variable is applicable here as well:  If otor pastures are not available this can indicate the 
use of an aggressive strategy by other herders. 
ATTGR: describes a herder’s attitude towards grazing reserves as a risk reduction tool. 
If herders feel grazing reserves are necessary, this can indicate that other herders' strate-
gies are seen as threatening. 
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GRCUR: describes the current functioning of grazing reserves. A positive perception of 
this functioning can indicate that the behaviour of other herders is not aggressive. 
SUFPINC: describes a herder’s assessment of possibilities to increase his herd, given ac-
cess to sufficient pastures. 
This PCA was carried out for the combined survey of 120 questionnaires and for the two 
sums separately (60 questionnaires each). 
The Principle Components Analysis (PCA) results in three factors for the Gurvansaikhan 
case and two factors for both the combined survey and the Ugtaal case. These are pre-
sented in Table . 
Table 6  Principal component analysis of six environmental perception factors in the 
two studied districts in Mongolia. 
 Combined  Gurvansaikhan  Ugtaal 
 Factors   Factors   Factors 
 1 2  1 2 3  1 2 
Current pasture conditions 0.029 0.862  0.777 0.162 -0.216  0.180 0.893
Change in pasture conditions -0.339 0.743  0.844 -0.153 0.104  -0.372 0.752
Access to otor pasture 0.832 -0.137  -0.083 0.834 0.136  0.828 -0.104
Attitude to grazing reserves 0.626 0.101  0.048 -0.035 0.919  0.747 -0.148
Functioning of grazing reserves 0.642 -0.076  0.054 0.832 -0.112  0.637 -0.075
Sufficient pasture to increase the herd 0.367 0.445  0.355 -0.076 -0.432  0.573 0.235
          
Variance explained 30.6% 24.0%  26.1% 24.0% 16.9%  36.9% 23.1% 
Number of observations 120  60  60 
The three dominating variables in the first factor of the combined survey (‘Access to otor 
pasture’, ‘Attitude to grazing reserves’, ‘Functioning of grazing reserves’) are all related 
to risk management. A high score indicates that the herder perceives he has two options 
in case of (unexpected) harsh weather conditions: he can either migrate to distant otor 
pastures or can access well functioning grazing reserves (of which he holds a positive 
view) nearer by. We can therefore describe this factor as an indicator of security. In 
Gurvansaikhan, this factor is split into two. The actual risk management tools are domi-
nant in the second factor, and the attitude towards one of these tools is dominating in the 
third. In Ugtaal, the same variables as in the combined survey dominate the first factor. 
But in this case, the variable ‘Sufficient pasture to increase the herd’ is also dominant in 
the factor. This is also a component of security, matching with the explanation of the 
first factor of the combined dataset. 
The second factor in the combined survey is also found in both the Gurvansaikhan and 
the Ugtaal surveys separately. A high score on this factor indicates a positive perception 
of the pasture conditions: current pasture conditions are good and have improved com-
pared to ten years ago. A low score means the opposite: current conditions are poor and 
the pastures have deteriorated in the last ten years. This factor seems to describe the per-
ceived environmental conditions. We also see this as a good proxy for a herder’s per-
ception of the behaviour of other herders, as it nicely captures the perceived collective 
outcome of the other herders. If there is a lot of overgrazing, the pastures will be in a 
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poor condition and vice-versa. In the combined survey, the variable ‘Sufficient pasture to 
increase the herd’ is almost dominating as well (and also positive, although of less im-
portance, in both Gurvansaikhan and Ugtaal). This demonstrates how pasture conditions 
are perceived from the point of view of the herder and gives a proxy for herders’ possi-
bilities in terms of enlarging their herd. 
3.2 Regression 
In order to gain insight into the possible explanations for the differences in perception, 
the following model was estimated for the factors derived in the previous section: 
1.  
1 2 3 4
5 6 7
Factor constant ISOLAT MOVE SEXS AVAGE
NRWOM NRFM INCOME error
i β β β β
β β β
= + + + +
+ + + +  
In addition, model 1. was also estimated for an indicator of herd growth and the fraction 
of male adult animals in the total herd, which are defined as (in sheep units, see Table 1): 
2.  
 Growth in herd size = (off spring – off take) / (total livestock) 
3.  
 Fraction of male adults in herd = (number of male adult animals) / (total livestock) 
Table 7 Meaning of the explanatory variables in the regression equations. 
Variable Explanation 
ISOLAT Sum of distances from summer and winter camps to the bag and sum centres (4 distances) 
MOVE Sum of distances between seasonal camps 
SEXS Sex of the interviewed person 
AVAGE Average age of the household 
NRWOM Number of women in the household 
NRFM Number of household members 
INCOME Total income in 2003 (sale of animals and animal products and other income)  
Table 7 shows the meaning of the variables, which are included in the regression, while 
the results of the regressions are presented in Table 8 – Table 10. Statistically significant 
estimates are denoted by stars:  *, P<0.10; **, P<0.05; ***, P<0.01. 
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Table 8 Regression result for the combined data set of both districts in Mongolia. 
 
Perception 
of security 
Perception 
of environment 
Growth in 
herd size 
Fraction of male 
adults in herd 
(Constant) -0.409 -0.133 0.122*** 0.253***
 (0.395) (0.411) (0.039) (0.051)
ISOLAT 3.84E-03 1.97E-03 1.47E-04 3.99E-04
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.00033) (0.00043)
MOVE 5.89E-03* -6.00E-03* -2.00E-04 -8.42E-04*
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.00034) (0.00045)
SEXS -0.348 0.299 1.06E-02 1.19E-02
 (0.191) (0.199) (0.019) (0.025)
AVAGE -1.13E-02 -4.59E-03 6.03E-04 -2.96E-04
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001)
NRWOM 0.24** -6.15E-02 6.15E-03 -5.02E-03
 (0.111) (0.115) (0.011) (0.014)
NRFM -5.73E-02 5.16E-02 4.00E-03 8.72E-04
 (0.075) (0.078) (0.007) (0.01)
INCOME 1.26E-07 1.97E-07** 2.05E-09 -1.20E-08
 (9.5E-08) (9.8E-08) (9.4E-09) (1.2E-08)
R2 adjusted 0.12 0.048 -0.034 -0.015
Table 9 Regression result for the district Gurvansaikhan. 
 
Perception 
of environment 
Perception 
of security 1 
Perception 
of security 2 
Growth in 
herd size 
Fraction of male 
adults in herd 
(Constant) 0.283 -0.184 -0.399 0.171*** 0.259***
 (0.58) (0.497) (0.569) (0.052) (0.057)
ISOLAT -7.77E-03 3.52E-03 4.74E-03 9.16E-05 -1.54E-04
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.0001) (0.0001)
MOVE 4.64E-03 7.74E-03 3.00E-03 -1.87E-03* 6.70E-04
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.01) (0.001) (0.001)
SEXS 0.145 -0.561* -0.161 -1.61E-02 6.89E-02**
 (0.287) (0.246) (0.282) (0.026) (0.028)
AVAGE -1.07E-02 -1.08E-02 -1.13E-02 8.25E-04 2.18E-04
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.01) (0.001) (0.001)
NRWOM 0.106 0.531*** 0.334* 1.17E-02 -2.09E-02
 (0.18) (0.155) (0.177) (0.016) (0.018)
NRFM 5.31E-02 -0.288*** -4.16E-02 -3.17E-03 6.39E-03
 (0.109) (0.094) (0.107) (0.01) (0.011)
INCOME -2.94E-08 3.33E-07*** -9.06E-08 6.18E-09 -1.98E-08
 (1.3E-07) (1.1E-07) (1.3E-07) (1.2E-08) (1.3E-08)
R2 adjusted -0.004 0.261 0.034 -0.02 0.076
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Table 10 Regression result for the district Ugtaal. 
 
Perception 
of security 
Perception 
of environment 
Growth in 
herd size 
Fraction of male 
adults in herd 
(Constant) 4.23E-02 -1.359** 8.66E-02 0.2**
 (0.658) (0.668) (0.067) (0.095)
ISOLAT 1.49E-03 5.29E-03 4.48E-04 1.11E-03
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
MOVE 7.80E-03 -1.51E-03 -3.81E-04 -1.08E-03
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001)
SEXS -0.481 0.341 3.82E-02 -4.86E-02
 (0.29) (0.294) (0.029) (0.042)
AVAGE -1.72E-02 1.56E-02 3.46E-05 -9.20E-04
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.001) (0.002)
NRWOM 0.195 -8.78E-02 -1.93E-03 -6.08E-03
 (0.166) (0.169) (0.017) (0.024)
NRFM -7.35E-02 0.107 1.76E-02 7.09E-03
 (0.125) (0.127) (0.013) (0.018)
INCOME -2.95E-08 4.43E-07** 2.40E-09 1.36E-08
 (2E-07) (2E-07) (2E-08) (2.9E-08)
R2 adjusted 0.09 0.063 -0.043 -0.066
Table 8 shows that herders, who travel longer distances (MOVE) and have a higher 
number of female family members, have a higher perception of security (first column). 
In addition, herders with high incomes have a better perception of the environment. This 
indicates that income matters, and it also indicates that relatively poorer herders tend to 
assign a lower value to their environment (second column). This result is intuitive as 
richer herders are more powerful and possibly find it easier to secure good quality pas-
tures, whilst poorer herders are left with pastures of lower quality. The result in the third 
column is insignificant, which indicates that there is no link between income and rate of 
herd growth. This suggests that there is no significant difference in the strategies (at least 
in the way of growth in animal numbers) of poor and rich herders. Therefore we cannot 
find evidence for our second hypotheses: that poor herders have a greater willingness to 
maximise their herd size. The result in the fourth column shows that a low frequency of 
movement explains the fraction of male adults in the herd, while the constant is also sig-
nificant. All we can conclude from this is that herds with relatively large number of male 
adults tend to move over shorter distances. 
Table 9 has five columns, as there are three factors for the case of Gurvansaikhan. The 
first column is fully insignificant. This means that, for the case of Gurvansaikhan, we 
find no explanation for the variance in perception of environmental variability. This also 
indicates that we have no evidence for accepting the first hypothesis on the link between 
environment and wealth. The second column shows the most significant result of all the 
regressions, even though it is hard to explain the factors underlying these correlations: 
Male respondents, with small families consisting of a comparatively large number of 
women, and who are relatively rich, correlate with a positive attitude to otor pastures and 
grazing reserves. The second indicator of security follows the same pattern and confirms 
the previous result for the number of women in the family (third column). The fourth 
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column shows that herders with a lower intensity of movement tend to increase their 
herd size. The result of the fifth column indicates that female-headed families tend to 
rear herds with relatively more male adults. We cannot find any explanation for such a 
result. 
Table 10 shows the results for Ugtaal. The first and third columns of the four regressions 
are totally insignificant. This means that we do not find any explanation for the percep-
tion of security and the maximizing behaviour of herders in Ugtaal. The fourth column is 
only explained by a trivial significant constant, which does not help much. The second 
column, however, presents us with an important correlation, namely that herders with a 
higher level of income tend to have a better perception of the pasture conditions. We had 
already found this result in the regression for the pooled data set. Once again, we have 
some evidence for the hypothesis that poorer herders face a worse environment in the 
district of Ugtaal. 
4. Game estimation 
4.1 The inter-herder game in Mongolia 
Consider the following situation: It is November and winter is about to start. Imagine a 
delineated winter grazing area in a Mongolian region. The summer grass-growth season 
is over and the winter pasture is restored and ready to be grazed. Around this time herd-
ers decide on an appropriate level of herd ‘off-take’ and slaughter a number of their ani-
mals.  
This situation can be formalised by identifying strategies and players in a game as fol-
lows: The herders are playing a game about what herd size to maintain. Their decisions 
have consequences, however. Principally, when herders choose to maximise their herd 
size, the risk of negative impacts from possible future dzud, droughts and diseases in-
creases. On the other hand, when they reduce their herd size, they may not fully benefit 
from the (winter) grazing opportunities. Taking these considerations into account, we 
can demonstrate how this game works by way of a metaphorical two-person two-strategy 
representation. 
In order to formalise possible conflicts, which can emerge between herders, we restrict 
the analysis to two equal herders {1,2}. In the case with n herders contesting for grazing 
pastures, we can distinguish between ‘Herder 1’, the challenger, and ‘Herder 2’, the con-
tender. ‘Herder 2’ is composed of all other herders contesting for the same winter pas-
ture. We need to assume that the challenger interprets the actions of other herders as a 
simultaneous move. Hence, we are dealing with a 1 versus n–1 persons game (see also 
Lise 2001; Lise et al 2001).3 
The herders choose their herd size, which determines the survival rate of their herd and, 
hence, their payoff. When both herders keep their livestock constant, they obtain x; when 
the herders increase their livestock they obtain y; when one herder increases his/her herd 
and the other keeps his/her herd constant, the herd-increasing herder obtains a and the 
                                                   
3  One of the earliest accounts of games among herders is the herdsman game as formulated by 
Muhsam (1973), which also is put in a 1 versus n–1 person setting. 
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herd-maintaining herder obtains b. Note that since we start our analysis from the view-
point of a normal year, the herders know that they can have access to well-stocked pas-
tures, even if it would not be sustainable in the longer term. Table 3 shows the resulting 
payoff matrix. 
Table 11 Payoff matrix for the game between two symmetric herders. 
  Herder 2: (contender) 
  Keep herd constant Increase herd size 
Keep herd constant x,x b,a Herder 1: 
(challenger) Increase herd size a,b y,y 
If the contender maintains his/her herd, there will be more grass left for the challenger 
who can feed his/her herd without purchasing additional and expensive fodder. If the 
contender maximises his/her herd size, it is still better for the challenger to do the same, 
as (s)he is not sure that when (s)he accesses the winter pasture, it will be in good grazing 
condition. This depends on weather conditions and possible overgrazing by other herd-
ers. Both herders, however, are better off with a mutual constant herd size. This puts 
them in a better position when facing a possible dzud, since the impact of a dzud will be 
much more severe in the case of a large herd size in the beginning of a extreme cold pe-
riod. The same reasoning is true for droughts: it is much more difficult to maintain a 
large herd size during a drought, particularly as a smaller herd is more mobile. Following 
this argument, we hypothesise that the game of setting herd sizes resembles a prisoner’s 
dilemma: 
4.  
 a x y b> > >  
Such a situation, where mutual cooperation is only possible through communication and 
trust (see for instance Fukuyama (1995)), is difficult to resolve. Another possible way to 
achieve mutual cooperation is through utility transfer.  For example, Bromley (1998) 
provides the economic rationale for an irrigation system where head enders put an exter-
nality on tail enders. Institution building is also an option, as clear grazing rights can 
avoid conflicts over grazing pastures. They also provide assurance to farmers that pre-
sent conservative behaviour can be rewarded by future access to greener pastures. Com-
munication, trust, transfers and well-defined property rights are all institutional measures 
that change the prisoner’s dilemmas into a harmonious situation.4 
Hence, we hypothesise that herders will maximise their herd sizes because there are no 
well-defined grazing rights (which could justify current lower levels of grazing), even 
though they are fully aware that this increases their vulnerability to dzud risk.  
4.2 Technical description of the game estimation procedure 
To estimate the herder game we need to construct the triple (πi,θ i,ϑi), where πi is the 
payoff for household i, (measured as the net income from the herd), while θ i is the strat-
                                                   
4  See for instance Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom et al (1994) for the linkage between institutions 
and resource management. 
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egy for household i, (measured as the growth rate of the herd), and ϑi is the strategy of 
all other herders (the contenders) as perceived by the challenger.  ϑi can be derived from 
the perceived environmental conditions, which is the second factor in the PCA in Ugtaal 
and the first factor in Gurvansaikhan. 
To interpret the value of the strategy, it is useful to normalize the strategy of the chal-
lenger θi and the strategy of the contender ϑi. In general, variable si can be converted into 
a fraction between 0 and 1 as follows: 
5.  
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The households can be assigned to four clusters, so that the Euclidean distance within 
clusters is minimized, while the Euclidean distance between clusters is maximized.5 The 
Euclidean Cluster Method (ECM) yields final cluster centres. The following Table 
shows how to assign the final cluster centres of the actions of the challenger (θ) and the 
contender (ϑ) to payoff-groups A, B, X, Y. 
Table 12  Assigning households into clusters, using final cluster centres.  
Choice of the herder (θ) Choice of other herders (ϑ) payoff group 
‘increase herd size’ ‘increase herd size’ Y 
‘increase herd size’ ‘keep herd size constant’ A 
‘keep herd size constant’ ‘increase herd size’ B 
‘keep herd size constant’ ‘keep herd size constant’ X 
Alternatively, it is also possible to sort the payoffs into four payoff groups by taking 0.5 
as the threshold value. We define values of θ and ϑ above 0.5 as participative behaviour, 
in the sense that herders try to keep their herd size constant, while values of θ and ϑ be-
low 0.5 indicates that herders are trying the expand their herd size. We refer to this sim-
ple way of splitting the payoffs as the Simple Threshold Method (STM). Assigning the 
payoffs was done as before and as shown in Table 12. 
Finally, the payoffs can be calculated by applying formula 6, where |X| denotes the num-
ber of observations in payoff-group X:  
6.  
 1 1 1 1; ; ;i i i
i A i B i X i Y
a b x y
A B X Y i
π π π
∈ ∈ ∈
= = = =∑ ∑ ∑ π
∈
∑
                                                  
 
4.3 Results 
The estimation procedure (as explained in the previous Section) is applied to derive the 
herder games in Ugtaal and Gurvansaikhan. In order to obtain insight into the assign-
ment of payoffs to payoff groups, the choices of the challenger and the contender are 
plotted in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The choice of the challenger, θ, represents the growth in 
 
5  This is possible through a standard procedure of SPSS (Norusis, 1990). 
Lise et al. 17
herd size; a high θ represents low growth, while a low θ represents high growth. The 
choice of the contender, ϑ, represents the perception of the environment; a high ϑ is a 
positive perception, while a low ϑ means a negative perception. Figure 1 and Figure 2 
show the result in the case of both the ECM and the STM. The clusters based on the 
ECM are represented by diamonds, triangles, circles and squares, while the clusters 
based on the STM are simply the four areas delineated by the thick lines in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2. 
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Figure 1 Scatterplot of strategies in Ugtaal. 
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Figure 2 Scatter plot of strategies in Gurvansaikhan. 
The interpretation of Figure 1 and Figure 2 already leads to an interesting finding, 
namely that there is more herd size maximising behaviour in Ugtaal than in Gurvansiak-
han. This is shown in the figures by the concentration of data in the lower left-hand side 
in Ugtaal (increasing herd size, quality of the environment perceived to be low) and the 
right-hand side in Gurvansaikhan (more constant herd size, irrespective of perceived en-
vironmental quality). 
The game estimation results (using the primary data as explained in Section 2) are pre-
sented in Table13.  
As we attempt to interpret the results as presented in Table 13, the game in Ugtaal ap-
pears to be ambiguous. On the one hand, we find a prisoner’s dilemma as hypothesised 
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in equation 4. with the ECM. If this were the case, then it is equilibrium behaviour to 
maximise the herd size, but with the institutional viable alternative where the herders are 
better off reducing their herd size. Inspection of Figure 1 shows that the division of pay-
offs based on the ECM is a bit arbitrary. On the other hand, the STM yields a reverse as-
surance game. If this is an accurate representation of the current situation, then there are 
two equilibriums in Ugtaal; however, the maximising herd size equilibrium leads to the 
highest payoff. Figure 1 shows that there is a significant difference between the division 
of strategies using ECM and STM. The STM division seems to get closer to reality. 
Table 13  The estimated herder game using primary data, when the strategy is to 
choose herd growth rate. 
 a b x Y Payoff order Name of the game 
Ugtaal.ECM 1246.6  487.4 241.6 a>x>y>b Prisoner's dilemma 
 (4)  (15) (41)   
Ugtaal.STM 248.1 455.3 268.9 655.0 y>b>x>a Reverse assurance game 
 (27) (19) (6) (8)   
Gurvansaikhan.ECM  1017.3 967.1 1049.2 y>b>x>a Reverse assurance game 
  (43) (12) (5)   
Gurvansaikhan.STM 862.0 1126.9 942.8 1330.1 y>b>x>a Reverse assurance game 
 (3) (19) (36) (2)   
 Note:  the number in the brackets denotes the number of observations within the payoff group. 
Payoffs are expressed in thousands of the local Mongolian currency Tugrik, which was 
equivalent to € 0.74 at the time of the survey. 
The game in Gurvansaikhan is easier to interpret. With both division methods, the same 
reverse assurance game was found. The interpretation of this game is equivalent to that 
of the second game in Ugtaal, namely that there are two equilibriums; however, the 
maximising herd size equilibrium leads to the highest payoff.  
Thus, there are viable institutional means to encourage herders to change their behaviour 
from herd maximisation (most common in Ugtaal) to keeping herd sizes constant. How-
ever, herders would need to be compensated for the loss of income incurred by keeping a 
small herd. If such a mechanism can be put in place, the transition to sustainable pasture 
management will be within reach. 
This result also ties in well with the study on carrying capacity dynamics undertaken by 
Dietz et al. (2004). According to their analysis, the carrying capacity is dynamic (de-
pendent on variation of temperature and precipitation), and has not yet been exceeded in 
more densely populated and relatively green district of Ugtaal, except during the dzud in 
1998. They also claim that the dynamic carrying capacity has been exceeded in the dryer 
and sparsely populated district of Gurvansaikhan. That the game in Gurvansaikhan still 
does not show a lower payoff for maximising the herd size may indicate that the deterio-
rating environment has not yet led to repercussions in terms of herder income. In addi-
tion, the absolute number of herders with fast growing herds is very small (i.e. Figure 2) 
in Gurvansaikhan. That there is a higher payoff under herd maximisation in Ugtaal sup-
ports the claim that there is still space for increasing herd sizes there. Hence, the game 
based on the STM seems to be the most representative for the situation in Ugtaal, allow-
ing us to reject the hypothesis that ‘the herder’s herd increasing game is a prisoner’s di-
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lemma’. Rather, it is a reverse coordination game in Ugtaal and a reverse assurance 
game in Gurvansaikhan. 
5. Conclusions 
The hypotheses that guided this study were: 
• The poorer the herders, the worse the quality of their pastureland; 
• The poorer the herders, the greater the willingness to maximise animal numbers; 
• Maximising animal numbers is optimal behaviour for herders; 
• There are viable ways to change herders' behaviour towards socially optimal animal 
numbers; 
• Herder behaviour which maximises animal numbers causes a long-term degradation 
of ranges, which increases poverty. 
A Principle Component Analysis on the perception of herders with respect to their envi-
ronment gave a mixed result. On the one hand, herders in Gurvansaikhan place the 
greatest importance on the environment, and have a mixed attitude to grazing security as 
the second and third factor. On the other hand, herders in Ugtaal value grazing security 
as most important issue, while their perception of the environment is only a secondary 
factor. 
Regressions with the primary data allow us to accept the first hypothesis: that ‘poorer 
herders perceive the quality of their environment as being lower’ in the case of Ugtaal 
and the joined cases, while we do not find such a result in Gurvansaikhan. We do not 
find any evidence for the second hypothesis. On average, the herders in Ugtaal are 
poorer than the herders in Gurvansaikhan. Still, this difference is not statistically signifi-
cant in the regressions. 
The modelled games indicate that it is indeed optimal behaviour to maximise herd size. 
This implies that herd sizes are likely to continue to grow at their current (unsustainable) 
rate, in the absence of policy intervention. However, this study also finds that a change 
in herders’ behaviour both in Ugtaal and Gurvansaikhan is perceivable. Nevertheless, 
this behavioural change is difficult to achieve, as it involves a move from an equilibrium 
with a high payoff to an equilibrium with a lower payoff. This decrease can grow to 30% 
in Gurvansaikhan and up to 60% in Ugtaal. Offering herders alternative income genera-
tion activities could help encourage a switch to an equilibrium with lower herd sizes. As 
such, this is one of the study’s key policy recommendations. In conclusion, herder be-
haviour can be altered for the benefit of the environment, but this will only be achieved 
if herders are compensated for the considerable losses caused by such a policy change.  
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